The Transcending Power of Goods: Imaginative Value in the Economy by Beckert, Jens
MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/4
The Transcending Power of Goods
Imaginative Value in the Economy
Jens Beckert
Jens Beckert 
The Transcending Power of Goods: Imaginative Value in the Economy
MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 /4 
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne  
April 2010
MPIfG Discussion Paper 
ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) 
ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet)
© 2010 by the author(s)
Jens Beckert is Director at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.
beckert@mpifg.de
MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed 
disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowl-




Go to Publications / Discussion Papers
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies  
Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany
Tel. +49 221 2767-0  




What do we value? For markets to operate and for economies to grow, producers must 
attract purchasers to the products they offer. In advanced capitalist economies, market 
saturation and decline of demand are constant threats to markets. But how do we un-
derstand why actors desire the things whose value they reveal in the purchase? In this 
article I distinguish between three types of value: Physical value, positional value and 
imaginative value. Based on Durkheim’s sociology of religion, I argue that imagina-
tive value emerges from the imaginative connections made between goods and socially 
rooted values, as well as the aesthetic ideals held by the purchaser. The article explores 
how the connection between objects and their symbolic meaning is created and main-
tained, and why the symbolic valuation of objects changes. By arguing that the imagina-
tive value of goods is closely linked to social values, I suggest that consumption is not 
the expression of a hedonistic individualism but inherently connected to the social and 
moral order of society. Durkheim’s sociology of religion is thus read as a sociology of 
valuation.
Zusammenfassung
Was schätzen wir wert? Märkte und wirtschaftliches Wachstum hängen davon ab, dass 
Verkäufer mit den angebotenen Produkten Käufer anziehen. In entwickelten kapitalis-
tischen Ökonomien sind Markterschöpfung und der Rückgang von Nachfrage immer-
währende Bedrohungen von Märkten. Wie aber können wir verstehen, weshalb Akteure 
die Waren begehren, deren Wert sie mit dem Kauf anzeigen? Der Aufsatz unterscheidet 
zwischen drei Typen von Wert, dem physischen, positionalen und imaginativen Wert. 
Ausgehend von Durkheims Religionssoziologie wird argumentiert, dass Wert auch in 
der imaginativen Verbindung zwischen Gütern und sozialen Werten sowie den ästheti-
schen Idealen der Käufer entsteht. Es wird untersucht, wie diese Verbindung zwischen 
Objekten und ihren symbolischen Bedeutungen entsteht und aufrechterhalten bleibt 
und warum sich der symbolische Wert von Gütern verändert. Wenn der imaginative 
Wert von Gütern eng mit sozialen Werten verknüpft wird, ist Konsum nicht Ausdruck 
eines hedonistischen Individualismus, sondern steht in Zusammenhang mit der mora-
lischen Ordnung der Gesellschaft. Durkheims Religionssoziologie wird so als Soziolo-
gie des Werts gelesen.  
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What do we value? All market exchange involves a sacrifice of scarce assets, usually 
money. An actor is only willing to make this sacrifice if he attributes value to the good 
he receives in return. If the exchange is voluntary, its occurrence presupposes that the 
buyer has a desire for the good he is purchasing, a desire that prevails over the money he 
must pay in exchange for it. For economies to grow, producers must attract consumers 
to the products they offer.
Large parts of the world are underdeveloped, and people in these places cannot satisfy 
even their most basic needs. In affluent countries, by contrast, purchasing power is high, 
and most people have satisfied their basic needs. One hundred years ago, households 
in OECD countries spent 80 percent of their incomes on the basic needs of food, cloth-
ing and housing. This figure has dropped to 30–40 percent today (Adolf/Stehr 2010: 3). 
In this situation of affluence, we must wonder why there is no saturation of markets, 
and why people continue to purchase ever more goods, instead of saving their money 
or working less. “Consumers do not automatically use surplus income to satisfy new 
wants” (Campbell 1987: 18). In advanced capitalist economies, market saturation and 
decline of demand are constant threats to markets (Fligstein 2001: 17). But how do we 
understand why actors desire the things whose value they reveal in the purchase? What 
is it that goods must promise so that actors form preferences for owning them and are 
willing to make sacrifices to obtain them?
In this article I address the question of what attracts customers to the goods they pur-
chase. In the first part of the article, I introduce a distinction between three sources 
of value: first, goods can be valued for the difference they make in the physical world. 
Second, they can be valued for the differences they make in the social world when they 
position actors in the social space. Third and finally, they can make a difference in the 
consciousness of the individual who owns or consumes them, in the form of the fanta-
sies that they evoke, and hence make a difference in the imaginative world. I designate 
these three respective types of value as physical, positional, and imaginative. Positional 
and imaginative value form the central concern of this article. They are the most critical 
to understanding the creation of value in affluent consumer economies, because posi-
tional and imaginative value have much higher potential for growth than goods valued 
only for their physical performance (Hutter 2009: 18; Reisch 2002: 227). They also pro-
vide a foundation to explain why demand grows despite affluence. While the creation 
of positional and imaginative value is in principle limitless, at the same time this value 
rests on shaky ground, since it is entirely anchored in the intersubjective recognition of 
symbolic qualities attached to the goods. Success “goes together with quick failure, as 
when the space for dreams associated with a particular brand no longer resonates with 
the symbolic needs of a large enough group of customers” (Djelic/Ainamo 1999: 628).
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In the second part I discuss the positional and imaginative sources of value with special 
reference to the work of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim has dealt with issues of value and 
price in the economy in his early work on the division of labor (Durkheim 1984) and 
the posthumously published lectures “Professional Ethics and Civic Morals” (Durkheim 
1992).1 The most informative concepts to address the question of valuation of goods, 
however, come from his “Elementary Forms of the Religious Life” (Durkheim 1965), 
even though this book does not deal with the valuation of economic goods.2 The sug-
gestion made here is that this book can be read not just as a sociology of religion, but as 
a sociology of valuation. I therefore follow approaches that connect market phenomena 
and religion (Deutschmann 2009a; Isenberg/Sellmann 2000). Based on Durkheim, I 
argue that value emerges from the symbolic connections made between goods and the 
socially rooted values, as well as the aesthetic ideals held by the purchaser. By arguing 
that the imaginative value of goods is closely linked to social values, I suggest that con-
sumption is poorly understood if it is seen as the expression of a hedonistic individual-
ism. Instead, consumption is in many ways connected to the social and moral order of 
society (Fischer/Benson 2006; Richins 1994; Stehr/Henning/Weiler 2006); it expresses, 
reinforces, or challenges this moral order, and is anchored in social practices.
In the third part I build upon Durkheim’s analysis of totemistic religions to explore 
how the connection between material objects and values is created and maintained. The 
final part of the article discusses the issue of change in the symbolic valuation of objects, 
a phenomenon not observed in the sacred objects of religion. The conclusion discusses 
the implications of the argument for investigating the valuation of goods on markets.
1 The performance of goods: Physical, positional and imaginative
The objects exchanged on markets are commodities. Commodities can be goods or 
services.3 A good, to use a definition by George Shackle, is “an object or an organiza-
tion which promises performance” (Shackle 1972: 178). For the good to have value, its 
purchaser must have a positive view of what he expects the good to perform: the good 
“makes a difference” for the owner through its (potential) performance. Goods com-
prise different types of value at the same time. This does not refer to differences such 
as the difference between a table and a chair, but rather means that goods provide dif-
ferent types of performance for their owners. The distinction proposed in this article is 
that the quality of a good can make a difference in the physical world, the social world 
1 See also Beckert (2002).
2 There are some marginal remarks to be found in the book that relate vaguely to the economy, 
but they receive no systematic treatment.
3 In this article I focus only on goods. This focus is chosen for reasons of simplicity. All arguments 
made here, however, are also applicable to services.
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or the imaginative world. Accordingly I speak of the physical, positional, and imagina-
tive value of goods. Note that this is not an essentialist distinction between goods, but 
between the sources of value that goods have; two or all three types can be – and often 
are – simultaneously present in any concrete good.
1. Qualities of goods that make a difference in the physical world alter a physical state 
in one way or another. A shirt covers a part of the body and keeps it warm. A car 
has value because it can bring the owner from place A to place B. A house provides 
shelter from the weather. A machine allows one object to be transformed into an-
other object which can be sold on the market for a profit. The list of examples of 
how objects make a difference in the physical world can be extended indefinitely. It 
can also be expanded to take into account differences in quality within one category, 
in order to distinguish goods of the same type. A car can be faster, safer or more 
comfortable than another car; a shirt can be warmer or more durable; one machine 
is more cost-efficient or time-effective than another. All of these are differences of a 
good with regard to its performance in the physical world. In the literature the physi-
cal performance of goods is often referred to as “functional value” (Valtin 2005) or 
“utilitarian value” (Ravasi/Rindova 2009: 10; Richins 1994), terms that are misplaced 
because they imply that objects can be valued without being functional, or that the 
function of goods is limited to their physical performance. This is not the case.
 While the physical performance of a good is objective, in the sense that it is a quality 
of the object itself, the valuation of a good’s physical qualities depends on the user’s 
cognitive understanding (Witt 2001: 27). Only by knowing the “how-to” of using 
the good can value be ascribed to it. The knowledge required for the physical per-
formance of a good implies that this type of performance cannot be distinguished 
from the other types of object performance based on the concept of meaning. The 
qualities are valued based on the knowledge of the potential purchaser, and differ-
ences in valuation can stem from the different meanings the recognized qualities of 
the object may have for different actors.4 There is no value without knowledge, and 
value differs between actors with different knowledge – a point famously analyzed by 
George Akerlof (1970).5
4 This is well-known from the observation made in innovation studies that at times the innova-
tors of a new product themselves do not understand the possible physical performances of their 
innovation. A familiar example of this is the Post-It markers that were invented by the 3M com-
pany (Garud/Karnoe 2001). The company happened to invent a “glue that did not glue” that 
was worthless to anyone until someone had the idea that this glue could be used for the sticky 
notes that today are used by millions of people.
5 Akerlof ’s analysis, however, implies that the problem is one of distribution of knowledge and 
not of the social constitution of qualities. Following Akerlof, once the qualities of goods are 
known to everyone, there is an objective basis for judging one good and comparing it to all 
others. This individualistic assessment fails to take into account that the criteria used to evalu-
ate product qualities are based on social conventions, i.e. that judgments of quality are socially 
constructed. These devices might be objective in the assessment of physical qualities which can 
easily be measured (such as the different chemical compositions of oil), but the object might be 
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2. The investigation of positional performance in sociological scholarship has been just 
as important as that of physical performance, if not more so. Here the value assigned 
to the product does not depend on its assessed (promised) transformative power in 
the physical world, but on its capability to position its owner within the space of a 
differentiated social world: 
Products routinely co-occur with certain types of people and social occasions, thereby allowing 
the members of a given society to infer, albeit often unconsciously, the positions and member-
ships of others. (Ravasi/Rindova 2009: 5)
 The positional performance of goods requires that there is agreement on their mean-
ing within the relevant group (Witt 2008; Reisch 2002: 232). Although there can be 
variation in the way an object is interpreted, a complete lack of agreement would 
make it impossible to use the object as a signifier of social status and social belonging. 
So positional value does have an objective basis, but this objectivity is not anchored 
in the physical qualities of the product; instead it depends upon what meaning in 
terms of social identity is ascribed to the product in the actor’s social environment.6
 The positional value of goods has been meticulously described in sociological and 
anthropological accounts, especially by Thorstein Veblen (1973), Georg Simmel 
(1919) and Pierre Bourdieu (1984). The early sociology of consumption emphasized 
the hierarchical stratification that occurs through possession and exhibition of lux-
ury goods, the social dynamics that develop out of attempts by lower social classes 
to imitate the consumption patterns of the upper classes, and the reactions to these 
imitations by the upper classes. More recent accounts of the social performance of 
goods place less stress on the element of status and class differentiation and focus 
more on the multilateral constitution of heterogeneous lifestyles based on different 
consumption patterns (Arnould/Thompson 2005). Differentiated lifestyles, which 
find expression in specific consumption patterns, constitute and express parts of the 
social identities of actors. Consumers construct a wide range of narratives of identity 
associated with certain kinds of products offered in the market, a process that can be 
interpreted as democratization of symbolic value creation (Djelic/Ainamo 2005: 8).
3. The imaginative performance of goods has in common with positional performance 
that the goods are valued for symbolic qualities; in both cases, the value of the good 
is based on ascribing qualities to it that transcend its materiality. “People buy things 
not only for what they can do, but also for what they mean” (Levy 1959: 118). Mean-
ing is not detached from the materiality of the product, since material qualities can 
themselves acquire symbolic meanings.
so complex that qualities could not be objectively established, or the qualities might be aesthetic. 
In this case, qualities are not only measured through judgment devices but established by them. 
We can see this at work when critics’ ratings of a wine (e.g. Parker) influence how consumers 
assess its quality.
6 As Durkheim (1965: 261) remarked with regard to totemistic emblems: the value “assumed by 
an object is not implied in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is added to them.”
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 The common feature of symbolic qualities explains why the positional and imagina-
tive qualities of goods are frequently treated as one category (Levy 1959). However, 
this intermingling ignores important differences in the way the symbolic comes into 
play. Imaginative qualities make a difference – and are valued – because they arouse 
images that alter the state of consciousness of the owner. The objects evoke fan-
tasies based on symbolic associations with desired events, people, places or values 
(McCracken 1988: 104ff.; Campbell 1987; Holbrook/Hirschman 1982; Ullrich 2006: 
45ff.). The good performs as an arbitrator or bridge between the subject and a de-
sired but intangible ideal. This can take place independently from the recognition 
of the ascribed value by others, but not independently from the assessments of the 
purchaser. Imaginative performance comes into play when the owner sees the good 
as a “connection” to espoused ideals symbolically represented in the object.
The distinction between positional and imaginative value partly follows the distinction 
between forms of symbolic consumption introduced by Marsha Richins (1994). Posi-
tional performance of a good is public, in the sense that a third party must attribute sym-
bolic meaning to the good, which forms the basis to classify the owner, i.e. bestowing a 
certain social identity upon him. This happens independently from the owner himself. 
The owner might be aware of the positional effects of his purchasing choices and take 
them into consideration, but the positional effects depend on the meanings ascribed to 
the good by others. In the case of imaginative value, it is the purchaser himself who must 
ascribe symbolic meaning to a good. This is a private act, though the symbolic mean-
ings reflect moral values and orientations that are socially constituted (Fischer/Benson 
Figure 1 Typology of value
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2006; Richins 1994). Hence the social positioning of the owner by others, via the pos-
session of objects, is not identical to the “bridging of displaced meaning” (McCracken 
1988: 104) through the imaginative performance of goods.7 The distinctions between 
the three types of value are depicted in Figure 1.
2 The totemistic qualities of goods
By what mechanisms do actors become attracted to the qualities of goods, if not by 
the physical performance of these goods? To address this question I refer to Emile 
Durkheim’s study on “The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life” (1965). I argue 
that this work can be read as a sociology of valuation. The aim is to understand the at-
traction to goods not as a simply hedonistic urge that has its psychological cause “in a 
desire for the pleasure which it brings” (Campbell 1987: 80), but rather to interpret it as 
a specific form of orientation towards the realization of values shared in social groups 
and as confirmation of membership in a moral community. This follows Durkheim’s 
intuition that secularization does not imply the extinction of the sacred in society but 
goes hand in hand with the emergence of secular forms of the sacred. While Durkheim 
demonstrated this social transformation primarily with regard to the expansion of 
rights granted to the individual (Joas 2000), I am arguing here that it also provides a 
model to analyze market demand.
In his treatment of totemistic religions in Australia, Durkheim deals with the role of reli-
gious practices in the social integration of these societies. The central insight Durkheim 
arrives at is that the moral influence of society over its members is not primarily based 
on felt obligations and fears of sanctions, but instead on a positive binding of the mem-
bers of the clan to the values of the social group. People feel attracted to the religious 
regulations (Durkheim 1965: 240f.). The notion of attraction is crucial for analogies to 
economic valuation, because if exchange is voluntary, demand for goods only emerges 
if the goods have a positive appeal, i.e., they provoke in others a desire to own them.
Based on this insight, Durkheim questions where this attraction to the values of society 
originates. He investigates the ritualistic practices of the Australian clans and the role of 
sacred objects in these practices, starting from the observation that the world of tribal 
society is strictly divided into two spheres, the sacred and the profane. Objects that sym-
bolically represent the clan – usually an animal and its representation in artifacts (the 
totem) – are separated from other objects through a strict set of rules on how to engage 
with them. These regulations are associated with the belief in the power – or mana – of 
7 An example to help clarify the difference can be taken from gambling. The possession of a lot-
tery ticket does not lead to a social repositioning. For the owner of the ticket, however, it can be 
a bridge that allows him to imaginatively transform his social position.
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these objects. This power of the totem is of course not inherent in the object itself, but 
attributed to it by the believers. Durkheim, however, insists that the power deriving 
from the sacred objects and felt by the clan members is not purely illusory, but can in 
fact be analyzed as the power of the moral community of the clan (1965: 236). The sym-
bolic qualities of sacred objects are “imaginative bridges to the transcendental” (Tap-
penbeck 1999: 50), in which the moral community finds a collective representation.
In his analysis of symbolic representation, Durkheim identifies a specific human capac-
ity at the core of religious beliefs. I will argue that this capacity also lies at the heart of 
attributing symbolic value to goods in the economy: namely, the faculty to attribute 
to objects qualities that exist only in the imagination and have no objective material 
correlate in the object itself. “[C]ollective representations very frequently attribute to 
the things to which they are attached qualities which do not exist under any form or 
to any degree” (Durkheim 1965: 259f.). The quality is symbolically represented in the 
object, “yet the powers which are thus conferred, though purely ideal, act as though 
they were real; they determine the conduct of men with the same degree of necessity as 
physical forces” (1965: 260). In this sense, the specific quality attributed to the object is 
fictitious and real at the same time. The fictitiousness of meanings does not imply that 
they are arbitrary, but neither are they determined by the objects themselves or by the 
neurological structures of the brain. Instead, they emerge from the cultural and social 
context of the actors.
One implication of these collective symbolic representations in objects is the possibility 
of positional value of goods. The capacity of goods to position their owners in the social 
space runs parallel to Durkheim’s analysis of the (mysterious) power of the totem: ac-
tors experience that the association with specific objects constitutes a specific recogni-
tion of the person. Goods bestow identities and signal membership in a social group in 
the same way that the totem constitutes the identity of the clan member. Consequently, 
a change in consumption patterns also leads to a change in social identity. The catego-
rization (classification) of a person follows the classification of the objects he consumes. 
In this way the objects exercise power over the individual.8 If the (potential) owner 
desires the social identity associated with the good, the good has an attraction that is 
independent from its physical performance and that is based on symbolic meanings.
The positional performance of goods is one important source of symbolic value. Yet it 
is not convincing to attribute the desire for a good that goes beyond the attraction of 
its physical qualities to only its status and identity effects. A second implication of the 
collective symbolic representations in objects is the possibility of imaginative value. The 
8 This is not to say that identities are completely created and maintained through consumption 
patterns, but all social groups make some demands on their members with regard to their con-
sumption patterns, and deviation from group norms is sanctioned. Groups differ widely with 
regard to their tolerance for deviations, however, and group membership in most cases involves 
other elements in addition to consumption patterns.
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same way the totem is the symbolic representation of the moral rules (values) of the 
clan, goods can become symbolic representations of secular values of the moral com-
munity. Durkheim (1965: 251) brings up the example of the flag as a material represen-
tation of the nation that is respected (valued) as a symbol standing for the values of the 
nation. The flag is a sacred object, representing the moral community and at the same 
time “being” this community. This is why, as Durkheim observes, soldiers in war will 
risk their very lives to defend their flag – a flag which matter-of-factly is no more than a 
piece of fabric that can be replaced cheaply (1965: 251f.).9
The analogy Durkheim makes between religious phenomena and military or political 
action can be extended to the valuation of material goods exchanged on markets, pro-
vided we show that the sacred can also be symbolically represented in commodities and 
can serve as a “bridge” to the transcendental.10 To develop this point, which extends 
Durkheim’s sociology of religion to a sociology of valuation, I will start with a quote 
from an interview with a wine connoisseur who reports on his experience when drink-
ing a bottle of very old wine:
The oldest red wine I have drunk was a Chambertin 1811. Imagine the sensations that it would 
provoke … the height of Napoleonic success, the symbolism is overwhelming. Furthermore, it 
was also the year when Halley’s Comet passed … Imagine having Halley’s Comet in your glass, 
a monumental slice of history. (Interview F. Audouze, quoted in Garcia-Parpet 2009: 13)
The value of the bottle of wine consumed – the price must have been several thousand 
euros – stems from the year it was produced, which for the person making this state-
ment symbolically represents two important historic events. It is not just the rarity of 
the wine and certainly not its taste which makes it valuable, but the possibility of an 
imagined association with events that took place long ago. The wine has the evocative 
force of connecting the person who consumes it to a distant time and to the events that 
were going on then. Because of their extraordinary character, the events – Napoleon’s 
power over Europe and the passing of Halley’s Comet – have the aura of the sacred. The 
same way the totem stands for the moral community of the clan and the flag stands for 
the nation, the bottle of wine symbolizes a cherished historical event and is a means to 
associate the purchaser with this event. The object gives a material shape to a transcen-
dental meaning by embodying this meaning. This connection presupposes the imagina-
tive, because the object and its meaning are discontinuous: their unity exists only as a 
mental construction (see Tappenbeck 1999: 104).
9 These phenomena of secular but sacred entities have also informed later discussions of civil 
religion (Bellah 1967; Luckmann 1967).
10 Durkheim himself pointed to the fact that collective representations can “out of the common-
est object … make a most powerful sacred object” (1965: 260). Yet he did not apply his insights 
from the analysis of totemistic belief systems to the economy. This is striking, because Dur-
kheim showed in his earlier work an intense interest in matters of valuation and price formation 
in the economy (Beckert 2002: 98ff.).
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Objects can be inscribed with meanings that conjure up mental images. In the case of 
religious symbols, these meanings remind the believer of the force of the community, 
while in the case of the consumer, they allow for an association with intangible ideals. 
The symbolic meaning transforms the object into an arbitrator, arousing mental sensa-
tions in the owner of the object that connect him to these ideals. This magical power 
of objects is a source of value because it provides the experience of pleasurable or even 
intoxicating sensations.11 But this is not an individual process. Durkheim emphasizes 
that the attraction to the ideals symbolically represented in the objects emerges from 
the community; the imaginative attributes of an object only have “power” to the extent 
that their perception is shared among members of a social group (Durkheim 1965: 
238). Thus the imaginative value of goods, though individually experienced, is a social 
phenomenon. 
Our taste for luxuries, for goods beyond our conventional buying power, is not simply 
greed, not only self-indulgence. It is also attributable to our need, as groups and as individu-
als, to re-establish access to the ideals we have displaced to distant locations in time or space. 
(McCracken 1988: 116)
3 Three dimensions of the transcendental
We can find unlimited instances where economic value is constituted based on sym-
bolic associations and the images these symbols arouse. Analytically, the transcendent 
power of goods can be ordered along three dimensions: the time dimension, associating 
the owner of the good with a distant past or a desired future state; the space dimension, 
connecting the owner of the good to (momentarily) unreachable desired places; and 
the social dimension, linking the owner of the good to people and social positions that 
are desired but factually out of reach. All three dimensions have in common that they 
transcend the “here and now” and allow the owner of the good to associate himself with 
intangible values or aesthetic ideals.
1. Examples of transcendence in the time dimension are the purchase of old wine and, 
more generally, the purchase of antique objects. The ownership of the objects al-
lows a symbolic connection to the cultural or political values of specific periods or 
historic people. Investments, on the other hand, i.e., objects bought in the present 
11 The mystical and quasi-religious appearance of commodities is also an important part of Marx’s 
analysis of commodity fetishism (Marx 1977). However, Marx attributes the exchange-value of 
commodities to the employment of labor power in the production process, and he defines as 
fetishism the actors’ perception of the exchange of goods as a relationship between goods, rather 
than a relationship between the actors themselves. In the analysis developed here, the mystical 
character of goods is located in the attribution of symbolic value. Hence value is understood not 
from the side of the production process but from the perspective of market exchange.
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with an imagined future value, extend the grasp of time into a period that has not 
yet arrived and extend the role of imaginative value from the demand side of the 
market into the supply side. The production of goods for the market evokes images 
of profit. But an orientation toward the future can also be related to the demand 
side. One example is Viviana Zelizer’s (1979) analysis of the emergence of the life-
insurance industry in the United States in the nineteenth century. Zelizer showed 
that life insurance found demand – i.e., became valuable to consumers – only once it 
was conceived as representing espoused values of caring for the family beyond one’s 
own lifetime and striving for social immortality. The value of the good emerged 
from the imagining of social recognition after death.
2. The space dimension of the imaginative value of goods is represented by products 
marketed based on their regional origin and traditional production methods. These 
products are valued because they carry meanings of place, which evoke in the con-
sumer images of proximity and of partaking in this desired local environment. Ex-
amples are products with an AOC label (or another label of distinct regional pro-
duction), which associates the products with images of locality. Fair-trade products 
connect the purchaser to an otherwise geographically and socially distant world and 
allow him to imagine “doing good” for people in a specific country.12 The value cre-
ated lies not in the physical qualities of the product, but in the opportunity it offers 
the consumer to put his value convictions into practice. The same way that symboli-
cally charged products allow for transcendence of time, they also allow for transcen-
dence of place, and thereby connect the owner to the ideals he associates with that 
particular location.
3. The social dimension of the transcendent power of goods partly shows in the “contact 
charisma” (Robert Merton) that objects can attain. An accessory like a handbag, if 
carried by an idealized celebrity like Madonna, becomes “infected” through this con-
tact. Owning the same handbag creates images of proximity to the idealized person 
and becomes a way of partaking in her identity. The aura of the singer is transferred 
to the purchaser of the handbag and becomes a quality that creates value in its own 
right.13 The parallel to a religious phenomenon is obvious: in the same way that 
everything touched by the prophet becomes part of the sphere of the sacred (Durk-
heim 1965: 254), the handbag, touched and carried by the idealized charismatic per-
son, becomes a symbolic representation of the charismatic power of this person; the 
object becomes a second-class relic.
12 Harrington (2008) found in her study of amateur investors in the United States that these inves-
tors evaluated stocks not only on their expected economic performance, but also based on an 
assessment of whether or not the investors “liked” the company. Companies that were disliked 
were usually engaged in businesses that were considered morally offensive. Selecting company 
stocks that correspond to an investor’s values is one example of the creation of imaginative 
value. The stock becomes a symbolic representation of espoused values, the purchase of which 
allows the owner to put these values into “practice.”
13 See also Durkheim (1965: 243ff.).
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 The social dimension of the transcendent power of goods, however, does not re-
quire that the object come into direct contact with a charismatic person. Djelic and 
Ainamo (2005: 39) provide an example of this in Charles Frederick Worth, a pioneer 
of women’s haute couture in the nineteenth century, who made deliberate references 
in his fashions to “aristocratic ways of life.” Through these references, he created 
symbolic representations of lifestyles of the upper class that allowed his customers 
an imaginative link to this social group.14 The imaginative transformation of social 
class can also be based on an imagining of future wealth. Lottery tickets, which con-
tain the remote possibility of a radical transformation of social position, conjure up 
fantasies of being part of the world of the rich. The tickets are not valued as a pru-
dent investment, but rather for their ability to summon these imaginings (Beckert/
Lutter 2007, 2009). In the harsh light of day, such a ticket is no more than a colorful 
piece of paper, worth not more than half of what has been spent for it, but it can pro-
voke sensations that allow its purchaser vicarious participation in the world of the 
rich. Speculative investments in financial products are likewise motivated by images 
of a changed social position through future profits and wealth (Buchanan/Vanberg 
1984; Keynes 1964). Joseph Schumpeter (1912) puts images of immortality at the 
root of entrepreneurial activity when he ascribes the motivation of the entrepreneur 
to a desire to found one’s own dynasty.15
Goods can be attractive because of their ability to summon images based upon what 
the goods symbolize in the three dimensions discussed; their value goes beyond their 
physical and positional performance. “[M]any of the cultural products offered for sale 
in modern societies are in fact consumed because they serve as aids to the construction 
of day-dreams” (Campbell 1987: 92). As is the case with the positional performance of 
goods, imaginative performance has a magical quality to it: it offers access to past his-
torical events, distant regions, espoused aesthetic or moral values, or unreachable social 
positions by making the object a symbolic representation of the otherwise intangible. 
On the strength of the mental images they arouse, goods can be vehicles to transcend 
time as well as physical and social space, allowing actors to participate vicariously in 
otherwise unreachable realms.16
14 The values that actors aspire to are socially differentiated; they need not be identical for every-
one (Bourdieu 1984).
15 Images of future monetary wealth, evoked by lottery tickets, investments in financial markets, 
or entrepreneurial activities, are symbolic associations with infinite wealth and thereby provide 
parallels to religious rituals aiming at closeness to God (Deutschmann 1999).
16 A new form of this transcendence through imagination can be seen in virtual worlds. “Digital 
theaters” (Molesworth/Denegri-Knott 2007) are games in which the players transcend their 
actual historical, spatial and social identities. Virtual worlds are also markets, where the “elec-
tronic equipment” for the aspired identities must be purchased. Conceptually, however, these 
products do not differ from the fictions in novels or films that evoke pleasurable fantasies in the 
reader or viewer.
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This value of the good is not purely illusory. Indeed, when goods become material repre-
sentations of otherwise abstract or distant events, values and ideals, they offer a mental 
realization of the desired. The symbolically charged good evokes sensations that virtu-
ally embody the realization of the desired state. Drinking the Chambertin from 1811 
evokes the sensation of actually being part of this time. Holding a lottery ticket in the 
hand allows the gambler to summon fantasies of being rich, which transforms the situ-
ation of being rich into an accessible state in the present. In this sense the symbolically 
charged object is not only a representation of the desired event, value or ideal, but also 
an essential part of what it represents by participating in the reality that it represents 
(cf. Tillich 1986: 5). Schumpeter (1912: 164) observes that from the moment the entre-
preneur begins to seriously realize a new combination, its existence becomes percep-
tible in a very real sense. If a desired state is attainable, at least in theory, then striving for 
it by taking practical steps to achieve it can provoke sensations that are similar to what 
would be experienced if the goal had already been achieved. Striving and attaining are 
not strictly separate from each other:
When we become sure that some desired good is actually to be ours or that some desired event 
is definitely going to happen … we experience the well-known pleasure of savoring that future 
event in advance … This savoring, this fusion of striving and attaining, is a fact of experi-
ence that goes far to account for the existence and importance of noninstrumental activities. 
(Hirschman 1986: 150f.)17
4 The role of practices
How do these transcendent qualities of imaginative value become attached to the objects 
that represent them? As a general rule, the meaning of a good and hence its value de-
rives from socialization, repeated interaction with the good, and participation in shared 
activities, as well as from corporate marketing (Richins 1994). Here again, a reference 
to Durkheim’s work is illuminating, because he identified the sources of attachment to 
religious and political symbols by looking to ritualistic religious practices. Durkheim 
observed that social life in the tribal communities fell into periods of everyday activities 
on the one hand, and periods of ritualistic festivities, during which the members of the 
clan assembled, on the other. These festivities would usually take place in physical prox-
imity to the totem of the clan. The passion and exaltation experienced through dance, 
music, fires, the darkness of the night, and the use of drugs would provoke a collective 
effervescence in which the clan members experienced a state of transcendence of their 
17 Hirschman connects this insight to religious experiences by quoting Pascal: “The hope Chris-
tians have to possess an infinite good is mixed with actual enjoyment … for they are not like 
those people who would hope for a kingdom of which they, as subjects, have nothing; rather, 
they hope for holiness, and for freedom from injustice, and they partake of both” (Pascal, pen-
sée 540, quoted in Hirschman 1986: 150f.).
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own consciousness. Since the totem was the center of these festivities, the clan mem-
bers would attribute this experience of self-transcendence to the power of the totem 
(Durkheim 1965: 252).
At first glance the reference to ritualistic practices might seem far-fetched for under-
standing the imaginative value of goods, but we can observe corresponding examples in 
affluent countries. The positive aura surrounding a good associated with a charismatic 
celebrity like Madonna might derive from experiences of collective effervescence, for 
instance what might be experienced attending one of her concerts. A reference to “ex-
traordinary” experiences can also hold true for the transcendent power of objects asso-
ciated with places. The regional product consumed while one is living in a given region 
or staying there on vacation might become associated with treasured memories of the 
place. High jackpots in the lottery lead to mass public ecstasy that parallels the intoxica-
tion described by Durkheim and increases demand for tickets. New models of cars or 
consumer electronics products are presented to the public in theatrical performances at 
fairs that show obvious similarities to the ritualistic practices described by Durkheim.
Durkheim, however, mentions a second mechanism needed to keep the “mana” of re-
ligious symbols alive. The passions created in the moments of collective effervescence 
lose their impression on the individual clan members over time. To avoid such dete-
rioration, religious groups and political movements alike assemble their members in 
meetings regularly to revitalize the values and beliefs of the community (Durkheim 
1965: 240). The church service or the party convention brings together the congregants 
and reminds the believers of the values of the community.
Similar connections between the stabilization of imaginative value of goods and group 
practices can be observed on markets. Markets in which the symbolic value of products 
plays an important role typically have a social organization that brings consumers and 
experts into communicative exchange to discuss the objects for sale. In the art market, 
for example, galleries will start a show with an opening, where potential buyers, the 
seller, the artist, fellow artists and art experts come together in a ritualistic affirmation 
of the quality of the objects to be sold. Museums and art critics also form part of the 
community of communication in the art world that reaffirms the value of the product 
and its sacred qualities and sets standards for the assessment of quality in communica-
tive practices (Becker 1982; Beckert/Rössel 2004; Velthuis 2005). In the lottery market, 
syndicate play leads to higher participation rates (Garvía 2007). In the car market, the 
symbolic value of the car is established and reaffirmed communicatively through ad-
vertisements and car magazines, visits to the car dealership, car races, and private com-
munication among lay “believers” who have faith in the qualities of the object. Post-sale 
advertising can remind the customer of the transcendent qualities of the car, protecting 
him from the danger of disillusionment. Vintage car owners form clubs and assemble 
regularly in ritualistic club meetings to admire the old cars they possess and there-
by reconfirm their value. Consumer electronics firms – Apple is the most prominent 
example – organize the release of new products by creating scarcities that bring the 
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most dedicated customers together to wait (sometimes overnight) in a long queue to be 
among the first to buy the product once the store opens. This creates a group experience 
of like-minded people. Group experiences can also be organized virtually, leading to 
para-social interaction (Horton/Wohl 1956), i.e. the illusion of face-to-face interaction 
through mass media. Consumers of Nespresso coffee, for instance, become members 
of a “Nespresso Club” and receive a magazine with regular updates about the product 
and its users. Magazine ads and television commercials remind potential customers 
of symbolic qualities of the products being advertised that would otherwise fade from 
consumer consciousness.18
Imaginative valuations are fragile constructs of the mind that need constant reaffirma-
tion in communicative practices if they are to be maintained. Following Hirschman’s 
(1986) analysis of the utopian element experienced in idealistic political practices, the 
value an actor places on an object will increase with the intensity of his personal en-
gagement with it. For the person who is ignorant about wine, a Chambertin from 1811 
might not have any specific significance (value!). It is the aficionado or expert who is 
deeply committed to the product for whom it has an intoxicating quality and superior 
value. This intoxication, however, must be constantly revitalized through reaffirmations 
of the symbolic content in social practices.
5 The dynamics of imaginative value
This opens up the question why the symbolic value of goods changes at all. While it is 
quite obvious that the physical value of a good changes with innovations, which add 
new and superior physical qualities, the dynamics of the symbolic qualities of goods are 
not as easily understood. It is here that the greatest difference from Durkheim’s analy-
sis of religion emerges. Durkheim pointed out that religious symbols remain stable: 
“While the generations change, [the totemic emblem] remains the same; it is the per-
manent element of the social life“ (1965: 252). Looking at monotheistic religions, it is 
certainly the case that the significance and meaning of specific sacred objects changes 
in the course of history and might remain theologically contested. Religions, however, 
do not exchange their sacred objects continuously. This is contrary to the dynamics of 
symbolic values in the economy; in capitalist economies, it is even a constitutive ele-
ment in reproduction, because the alteration in symbolic value attributions is a source 
of growth. But what mechanisms are responsible for these varying dynamics of sym-
bolic value in the market sphere?
18 In this sense advertising is not just manipulative, as a long tradition of cultural criticism main-
tains (Adorno/Horkheimer 2002; Galbraith 1958), but constitutive of the symbolic content of 
goods.
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1. The first mechanism is the logic of differentiation, described by Georg Simmel (1919) 
and referring to the positional value of goods. If the purpose of consumption beyond 
the physical qualities of goods is to signal higher social status through the exclusivity 
and novelty of the products consumed, goods lose value once they become popular 
and are consumed by lower social classes, or are diffused into the mainstream, be-
yond the margins of a defined social group. This means that ever more novel objects 
must be defined as symbolic representations of distinction, a mechanism that finds 
expression in continuous processes of valuation and devaluation.
2. The second mechanism stems from the process of appropriation itself, which leads 
to a devaluation of the acquired object. This relationship between appropriation and 
devaluation has also been examined in part by Georg Simmel. In his “Philosophy of 
Money” (2004) Simmel analyzes value as emerging from a distance between subject 
and object:
We desire objects … in terms of [their] distance as something not-yet-enjoyed, the subjective 
aspect of this condition being desire. … The object thus formed, which is characterized by its 
separation from the subject, who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his 
desire, is for us a value. The moment of enjoyment itself, when the separation of subject and 
object is effaced, consumes the value. Value is only reinstated as contrast, as an object separated 
from the subject. Such trivial experiences as that we appreciate the value of our possessions only 
after we have lost them … (Simmel 2004: 66)
A similar idea of disillusionment is advocated by Colin Campbell (1987). For Campbell, 
however, it is not the loss of the distance between subject and object as such which 
leads to the devaluation, but rather the disappointment that stems from the discrepancy 
between the perfection in which the object was imagined and the imperfections vis-
ible once it is in the owner’s possession. “Since reality can never provide the perfected 
pleasures encountered in day-dreams … each purchase leads to literal disillusionment, 
something which explains why wanting is extinguished so quickly” (Campbell 1987: 
90). Hence it is not the closing of the distance to the object itself which produces disil-
lusionment, but more precisely the closing of the distance to the imaginative.
Both authors are right in pointing to a process of disillusionment associated with the 
appropriation of goods. Nevertheless, we reach a different perspective on the cause of 
this disillusionment if we compare economic goods to the totem: the disillusionment is 
specific to the commodity. Goods sold on the market hold the promise that possessing 
them will indeed lead to the appropriation of the espoused dimensions symbolically 
represented in the object. The (potential) purchaser sees in the object the embodiment 
of the transcendent, which can be appropriated through the purchase. It is this reifying 
illusion which at the same time constitutes the attraction of the goods and is the source 
of their devaluation once they are actually possessed.
We can see this in a comparison to religious symbols. The religious ideals always remain 
physically unattainable for the faithful, and therefore distanced. While the totem allows 
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the follower to achieve spiritual closeness to the sacred through proximity to the sacred 
object, its possession is in no way thought to be a possible realization or appropriation 
of the espoused ideals. The significance of religious objects does not go beyond repre-
sentation; their possession serves only to remind the member of the community of the 
values that the community stands for and of his or her membership in the community. 
This difference is also expressed in the strict regulation of, and restrictions on access to, 
the sacred object. Followers might not be allowed to touch or even see the totem except 
during special religious festivities. The secular good, by contrast, maintains this distance 
from the consumer only until it has been purchased. The sacrifice made with the pur-
chase allows the object to be appropriated and used, i.e., carried into the world of the 
profane. This possession at the same time reduces the good’s imaginative value, because 
the object “is now an incipient part of the ‘here and now’ and to this extent vulnerable to 
contradiction” (McCracken 1988: 112). While the object appears to be part of the tran-
scendental quality it represents, this is at the same time logically and empirically impos-
sible; this fact is experienced once the object has been purchased and appropriated.
On the one hand, the promise of appropriating the transcendental qualities through 
the purchase of the good is indispensable to inducing the purchaser to pay for it. On 
the other, this promise triggers disillusionment, because once the object is possessed, 
the imaginative space shrinks, and the purchaser attains only the immanent (profane) 
qualities. Here the reification of values in commodities reaches its limit. The commu-
nicative efforts of producers, as described in the previous section, attempt to reduce 
and defer this disappointment – by reconfirming the transcendental qualities of the 
good through post-sale communications, or by creating new symbolic values for the 
object, for instance applying the time dimension to turn a used car into an antique. The 
consumer can postpone the disillusionment by postponing consumption of the good 
(e.g., not drinking the Chambertin from 1811) or restricting the use of the product (e.g., 
wearing a new suit only for special occasions), keeping it symbolically within the realm 
of the sacred.19
The only exception, where this process of disappointment and devaluation does not 
apply, is in the accumulation of money. Since money is devoid of any of the concrete 
characteristics of a good and at the same time offers the freedom to buy any good with it 
(Parsons 1963), in a way it is the most perfect material representation of the sacred, one 
that withstands the disillusionment of appropriation. Money cannot be contradicted by 
experience, because money is an abstraction (Deutschmann 2009b; Parsons 1963; Sim-
mel 2004). The only threat to the imaginative value of money is its devaluation through 
inflation. One can see the special attraction of money in its duality: having no concrete 
qualities itself, money still allows for the potential to obtain any qualities desired. At the 
19 It would be an important question to investigate which types of products are more vulner-
able to disillusionment than others. One hypothesis would be that products which can also be 
defined as investment goods (art, real estate, jewelry etc.) are less vulnerable because they can 
evoke fantasies of increased wealth after their purchase. See also the paragraph on money.
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same time, it makes the question of why actors purchase goods even more puzzling, be-
cause consumer goods must have a higher value than the perception of the potentiality 
embodied in the money not spent (Ullrich 2006: 59ff.).
The described limits of the reified representation of values in goods also trigger the 
dynamics of imaginative value. The symbolic representation of the sacred in the ob-
ject must be projected onto new objects each time a new good is appropriated. While 
the owner is invariably disappointed with the promised value once an object has been 
purchased, this promise remains in other objects not yet possessed. Once imaginative 
goods are appropriated, “the individual must swiftly transfer ‘bridge’ status from the 
purchased object to one that is not now owned” (McCracken 1988: 115). One can speak 
of a specifically human vulnerability that stems from our ability to create fiction (see 
below) but also from our “need for fiction” (Iser 1991).20 In an economic system that 
depends on the willingness of consumers to desire more and newer products, human 
fiction-ability creates a demand for products that is independent of the difference the 
product makes in the physical world. In advanced economies, this is an ever more im-
portant source of economic growth, and it remains a source of motivation even if the 
consumed products do not lead to heightened levels of satisfaction (Frank 1999: 64ff.). 
The paradox evolving is that it is “absolutely essential for us never to receive what it is 
we want” (McCracken 1988: 116).
It is here that the supply side of production comes together with the demand side. Pro-
ducers, who are dependent on the marketability of their products, invest in associating 
their products with consumers’ espoused ideals: through advertisements, and market-
ing activities more generally, producers attempt to find out and construct what con-
sumers value. This is a necessarily dynamic process for two reasons. First, the constant 
disappointments following the purchase of goods create an unending demand for new 
products. The shift in imaginative associations is possible because, as Durkheim ar-
gued, the symbolic qualities can in principle be attached to any object. And second, 
the charging of products with symbolic value is contested between competing produc-
ers. Producers compete to attach consumers to their products and to detach consum-
ers from the products of their competitors (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002). While 
the charging of products with imaginative value is manipulative and reifies the desires 
of actors to “appropriate” transcendent values, it also promises an imaginative salva-
tion by providing access to intangible ideals.21 Because of the mechanisms described, 
this salvation is never achieved in full. But the manner in which producers’ needs to 
20 The most comprehensive treatment of the role that fantasies of a desired, better world play is 
probably Ernst Bloch’s “The Principle of Hope” (1995). While Bloch focuses on the utopian po-
litical potential anchored in the human ability to imagine a better future, he explicitly also dis-
cusses the experience of consumers who daydream of new identities when (window-)shopping. 
The transcending, i.e. utopian, force of human imagination forms the core of Bloch’s analysis.
21 We can speculate that this need is less acute for people who are engaged in artistic, intellectual 
or entrepreneurial activities. Such creative activities provide an illusory access to the sacred 
(creating beauty, finding the truth, creating the new) that satisfies the needs that other actors 
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sell their products correspond to consumers’ aspirations to find symbolic representa-
tions of their transcending desires shows how imaginative value can significantly con-
tribute to the system integration of the economy and the social integration of society.
6 Conclusion
Investigations of the economy in political economy and economic sociology focus pri-
marily on the supply side of markets. Market sociology, too, puts much more emphasis 
on firms and their coordination in competition than it does on the demand side. Such a 
productionist bias does not do justice to contemporary economies. In advanced econo-
mies, where many consumer needs are satisfied, consumers’ motivation to buy products 
cannot be taken for granted. One precondition for markets to function is that consum-
ers value the products being offered and are willing to make sacrifices in order to pos-
sess them. Where does this willingness stem from? The distinction between the physical, 
positional and imaginative value of goods provides a tableau of different value sources 
in the economy. The focus of the article is on the imaginative performance of goods as 
a source of value and economic growth.
Durkheim’s sociology of religion provides important insights into the construction of 
imaginative value. Durkheim’s work is read here as a sociology of valuation: his claim 
that the totem emblem is respected as the symbolic representation of the values of the 
social group is transposed to the valuation of secular goods in contemporary societies. 
While the role of imaginative value has been the subject of treatments in the investigation 
of consumption (Campbell 1987; McCracken 1988; Ullrich 2006; d’Astous/Deschênes 
2005), these studies are limited in part because they use a psychological desire for new-
ness or other individual traits to explain imaginative value. Contrary to their explana-
tion, I have argued that the imaginative performance of goods is based on the charging 
of these goods with values and ideals prevailing in the social field. These can be aesthetic 
or normative ideals that find a symbolic representation in the object. One implication 
of this claim is that markets, instead of being the expression of an unbound individual-
ism, become more integrated into the moral fabric of society as the basis of valuation 
shifts to the positional and imaginative performances of goods in affluent economies. 
This corresponds to claims of a “moralization” (Stehr 2007) and “aesthetization” (Rös-
sel 2007) of markets. Moreover, it provides evidence in the sphere of the economy for 
a claim that Emile Durkheim has made with regard to social development in general, 
namely that processes of secularization do not lead to the elimination of the sacred but 
to the emergence of secularized forms of the sacred. One way in which the sacred finds 
expression in modern societies is through consumption practices. In this paper, I take is-
project onto objects. This would explain also why these groups are often snobbish, cynical or 
morally opposed to consumerism. Cf. Adorno/Horkheimer (2002); Arendt (1958).
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sue with the assertion that the sacredness of an object becomes contaminated when that 
object is brought into the sphere of market exchange. Instead, I argue that symbolically 
charged commodities are also representations of value – not just in the economic sense, 
but also in the moral sense of the term (see Fourcade-Gourinchas 2009).
The reference to Emile Durkheim allows us to conceptualize the social practices through 
which goods become charged with imaginative value and through which actors in the 
field attempt to maintain (or destroy) this value. Experiences of collective effervescence 
are one source of imaginative value. The communication between consumers, experts, 
producers and critics is meant to keep the imaginative value alive and shield it from the 
disappointment that sets in once the product is actually possessed. The communicative 
practices surrounding the construction of imaginative value are part of socialization 
(Vergesellschaftung), and thus part of the fabric of society. At the same time, the men-
tal representation of intangible ideals in objects and the striving to realize these ideals 
through the purchase of these objects entails a utopian element, whose contribution to 
the understanding of social dynamics goes far beyond the sphere of consumption. Both 
entrepreneurial action and intergenerational strategies of wealth accumulation (e.g. 
maintaining an inheritance for one’s children) show very similar characteristics to the 
striving for a utopian state (Schumpeter 1912: 164ff.). As in Max Weber, this connec-
tion to utopianism hints at transcendental motivations underlying rational economic 
action. Unlike Weber’s view, however, this new outlook identifies the non-rational core 
of economic action in consumer’s and investor’s projection of the sacred onto objects 
attainable on the market, rather than seeing it in the disciplinary effects of religious 
doctrines. What do we value? When it comes to imaginative value, the answer may be 
straightforward: We value our values.
24 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/4
References
Adolf, Marian/Nico Stehr, 2010: Zur Dynamik des Kapitalismus. In: Alihan Kabalak/Karen van den 
Berg/Ursula Pasero (eds.), Capitalism Revisited. Festschrift für Birger Priddat. Marburg: Metropo-
lis, forthcoming.
Adorno, Theodor W./Max Horkheimer, [1944]2002: Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press.
Akerlof, Georg A., 1970: The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms. 
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
Arendt, Hannah, 1958: The Human Condition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Arnould, Eric J./Craig J. Thompson, 2005: Consumer Culture Theory (CCT): Twenty Years of Re-
search. In: Journal of Consumer Research 31, 868–882.
Becker, Howard S., 1982: Art Worlds, Berkeley and Los Angeles. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.
Beckert, Jens, 2002: Beyond the Market: The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Beckert, Jens/Mark Lutter, 2007: Wer spielt, hat schon verloren? Zur Erklärung des Nachfrageverhal-
tens auf dem Lottomarkt. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 59, 240–270.
——, 2009: The Inequality of Fair Play: Lottery Gambling and Social Stratification in Germany. In: 
European Sociological Review 25, 475–488.
Beckert, Jens/Jörg Rössel, 2004: Kunst und Preise: Reputation als Mechanismus der Reduktion von 
Ungewissheit am Kunstmarkt. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 56, 32–
50.
Bellah, Robert N., 1967: Civil Religion in America. In: Dædalus, Journal of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences 96, 1–21.
Bloch, Ernst, 1995: The Principle of Hope. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1984: Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Buchanan, James M./Viktor J. Vanberg, 1984: The Market as a Creative Process. In: Daniel M. Haus-
man (ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 379–398.
Callon, Michel/Cécile Méadel/Vololona Rabeharisoa, 2002: The Economy of Qualities. In: Economy 
and Society 31, 194–217.
Campbell, Colin, 1987: The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
d’Astous, Alain/Jonathan Deschênes, 2005: Consuming in One’s Mind: An Exploration. In: Psychol-
ogy & Marketing 22, 1–30.
Deutschmann, Christoph, 1999: Die Verheißung des absoluten Reichtums: Zur religiösen Natur des 
Kapitalismus. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.
——, 2009a: Capitalism and Religion: An Unorthodox View. In: Detlef Junker/Wilfried Mausbach/
Martin Thunert (eds.), State and Market in a Globalized World: Transatlantic Perspectives. Heidel-
berg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 135–146.
——, 2009b: Soziologie kapitalistischer Dynamik. MPIfG Working Paper 09/5. Cologne: Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies.
Djelic, Marie-Laure/Antti Ainamo, 2005: The Telecom Industry as Cultural Industry? The Trans-
position of Fashion Logics into the Field of Mobile Telephony. In: Candance Jones/Patricia H. 
Thornton (eds.), Transformation in Cultural Industries. Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI, 45–80.
——, 1999: The Coevolution of New Organizational Forms in the Fashion Industry: A Historical 
and Comparative Study of France, Italy, and the United States. In: Organization Science 10, 622–
637.
Durkheim, Emile, [1912]1965: The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: The Free Press.
——, [1893]1984: The Division of Labour in Society. London: Macmillan.
Beckert: The Transcending Power of Goods 25
Durkheim, Emile, [1957]1992: Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. New York: Routledge.
Fischer, Edward F./Peter Benson, 2006: Broccoli and Desire: Global Connections and Maya Struggles in 
Postwar Guatemala. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Fligstein, Neil, 2001: The Architecture of Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fourcade-Gourinchas, Marion, 2009: Price and Prejudice: Economic Technology as Cultural Prac-
tice. Unpublished manuscript. Berkeley: University of California–Berkeley.
Frank, Robert H., 1999: Luxury Fever. New York: The Free Press.
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 1958: The Affluent Society. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Garcia-Parpet, Marie-France, 2009: Le Marché de l’Excellence. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Garud, Raghu/Peter Karnoe, 2001: Path Creation as a Process of Mindful Deviation. In: Raghu Gar-
ud/Peter Karnoe (eds.), Path Dependence and Creation. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1–40.
Garvía, Roberto 2007: Sindication, Institutionalization and Lottery Play. In: American Journal of So-
ciology 113, 603–653.
Harrington, Brooke, 2008: Pop Finance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hirschman, Albert, 1986: Rival Views of Market Society. New York: Viking Press.
Holbrook, Morris B./Elizabeth C. Hirschman, 1982: The Experimential Aspects of Consumption: 
Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun. In: Journal of Consumer Research 9, 132–140.
Horton, Donald/R. Richard Wohl, 1956: Mass Communication and Para-Social Interaction: Obser-
vations on Intimacy at a Distance. In: Psychiatry 19, 215–229.
Hutter, Michael, 2009: Constant Surprises: Creating Value in the Creative Industries. Conference paper.
Third Conference on Economic Sociology and Political Economy “Valuation and Price Forma-
tion on Markets,” Villa Vigoni, Italy, June 14 to 17, 2009.
Isenberg, Wolfgang/Matthias Sellmann (eds.), 2000: Konsum als Religion? Über die Wiederverzaube-
rung der Welt. Mönchengladbach: Kühlen.
Iser, Wolfgang, 1991: Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre: Perspektiven literarischer Anthropologie. Frank-
furt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
Joas, Hans, 2000: The Genesis of Values. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Keynes, John Maynard, [1936]1964: The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
Levy, Sidney J., 1959: Symbols for Sale. In: Harvard Business Review 37, 117–124.
Luckmann, Thomas, 1967: The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New 
York: Macmillan.
Majima, Shinobu/Alan Warde, 2008: Elite Consumption in Britain, 1961–2004: Results of a Prelimi-
nary Investigation. In: The Sociological Review 56, Supplement 1, 210–239.
Marx, Karl, [1867]1977: Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Vol. 1, 12th edition. Berlin: 
Dietz.
McCracken, Grant, 1988: Culture and Consumption. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Molesworth, Mike/Janice Denegri-Knott, 2007: Digital Play and the Actualization of the Consumer 
Imagination. In: Games and Culture 2, 114–133.
Parsons, Talcott, 1963: On the Concept of Political Power. In: Proceedings of the American Philosophi-
cal Society 107, 232–262.
Ravasi, Davide/Violina Rindova, 2009: Valuing Objects as Cultural Symbols: A Conceptual Framework 
and Empirical Illustration. Conference paper. Third Conference on Economic Sociology and 
Political Economy “Valuation and Price Formation on Markets,” Villa Vigoni, Italy, June 14 to 
17, 2009.
Reisch, Lucia A., 2002: Symbols for Sale: Funktionen des symbolischen Konsums. In: Christoph 
Deutschmann (ed.), Die gesellschaftliche Macht des Geldes. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Richins, Marsha L., 1994: Valuing Things: The Public and Private Meanings of Possessions. In: Jour-
nal of Consumer Research 21, 504–521.
Rössel, Jörg, 2007: Ästhetisierung, Unsicherheit und die Entwicklung von Märkten. In: Jens Beckert/
Rainer Diaz-Bone/Heiner Ganßmann (eds.), Märkte als soziale Strukturen. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Campus, 167–181.
Schumpeter, Joseph, 1912: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
26 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/4
Shackle, George L. S., 1972: Epistemics & Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines. Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Simmel, Georg, [1908]1919: Die Mode. In: Georg Simmel (ed.), Philosophische Kultur. Leipzig: Krö-
ner, 25–57.
——, [1978]2004: Philosophy of Money. 3rd edition. London: Routledge.
Stehr, Nico, 2007: Moral Markets: How Knowledge and Affluence Change Consumers and Products. 
Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Stehr, Nico/Christoph Henning/Bernd Weiler (eds.), 2006: The Moralization of the Markets. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Tappenbeck, Inka, 1999: Phantasie und Gesellschaft: Zur soziologischen Relevanz der Einbildungskraft. 
Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.
Tillich, Paul, 1986: Symbol und Wirklichkeit. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht.
Ullrich, Wolfgang, 2006: Habenwollen: Wie funktioniert die Konsumkultur? Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.
Valtin, Alexandra, 2005: Der Wert von Luxusmarken: Determinanten des konsumentenorientierten 
Markenwerts und Implikationen für das Luxusmarkenmanagement. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Uni-
versitätsverlag.
Veblen, Thorstein, [1899]1973: The Theory of the Leisure Class. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Velthuis, Olav, 2005: Talking Prices. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Witt, Ulrich, 2001: Learning to Consume: A Theory of Wants and the Growth of Demand. In: Journal 
of Evolutionary Economics 11, 23–36.
——, 2010: Symbolic Consumption and the Social Construction of Product Characteristics. In: 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 21(1), 17–25.
Zelizer, Viviana, 1979: Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States. 
New York: Columbia University Press.

Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG
MPIfG Discussion Papers
DP 10/3
M. Höpner, T. Müllenborn
Mitbestimmung im 
Unternehmensvergleich: 
Ein Konzept zur Messung 














Institutions in History: Bringing 
Capitalism Back In
DP 09/7
M. Höpner, A. Petring,  
D. Seikel, B. Werner
Liberalisierungspolitik: 
Eine Bestandsaufnahme 
von zweieinhalb Dekaden 




Trust and Estate Planning:  
The Emergence of a Profession 
and Its Contribution to Socio-
Economic Inequality
DP 09/5
J. S. Ahlquist, C. Breunig










J. Beckert, W. Streeck (Hg.)
Die deutschen 
Sozialwissenschaften 
und die Gründung des 
Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Gesellschaftsforschung:
Ariane Leendertz, Reimar Lüst 
und Franz-Xaver Kaufmann 
über die Signaturen einer 
Umbruchzeit
WP 09/16
B. Dankbaar, G. Vissers
Of Knowledge and Work
WP 09/15
S. Mitchell, W. Streeck
Complex, Historical, Self-




German Companies Engaging 
in China: Decision-Making 
Processes at Home and 




Flexible Employment, Flexible 











Community and Autonomy: 
Institutions, Policies and 
Legitimacy in Multilevel 
Europe
Campus, 2010 






Wirtschaftselite und das Ende 
der Deutschland AG
Campus, 2009
C. Crouch, H. Voelzkow
Innovation in Local Economies: 
Germany in Comparative 
Context
Oxford University Press, 2009 




Befunde der Policy- und 
Verbändeforschung
VS-Verlag, 2009 
K. van Kersbergen,  
P. Manow (eds.)
Religion, Class Coalitions,  
and Welfare States




Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Working Papers
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG website 
(free).
MPIfG Books




Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for 
newsletters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure.
ERPA
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa.
